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subsidies on export activities we find no impact of subsidies on the probability to start 
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Most governments – in developing as well as in developed countries - 
maintain explicit export promotion policies ranging from lower tax rates for export 
earnings to direct subsidization of exporting activities. This is not surprising since 
exporting success is seen by many policy makers and the public alike as a key 
indicator of a nation’s economic performance.  What needs to be kept in mind, 
though, is that in general explicit export subsidization is illegal under WTO rules.  
Furthermore, whether or not such export promotion policies are successful in 
stimulating exports is still disputed.  For example, Bernard and Jensen (2004) find 
that state level export promotion expenditures in the US do not have a significant 
effect on exporting at the firm level.  By contrast, Volpe Martincus and Carballo 
(2009) and Helmers and Trofimenko (2009) find some positive effects of export 
subsidies using firm level data for Peru and Colombia, respectively.   
Recent theory and evidence in heterogeneous firm type models find that only 
firms that are productive enough select to become exporters, due to sunk costs of 
exporting.  This suggests an alternative strategy for governments interested in 
fostering exports, namely, help firms to improve production-related aspects to assist 
them to overcome these barriers to exporting.  In this regard, a number of papers 
have investigated whether production-related subsidies have an impact on firms’ 
export performance.  Görg et al. (2008) report that while such production subsidies in 
the Republic of Ireland do not encourage firms to start exporting, they encourage 
previous exporters to export more.  Girma et al. (2007) investigate the exporting 
effects of production subsidies in China and find positive effects that are more 
pronounced among firms that are in capital intensive industries and are already 
export active.     
  2  This paper contributes to this literature by presenting first evidence on the link 
between subsidies aimed at production-related aspects of firm activities, and exports 
for Germany, a leading actor on the world market for goods and services. Using 
newly available representative panel data for manufacturing enterprises in West and 
East Germany we document that only a small fraction of enterprises is subsidized, 
and that exports and subsidies are positively related. Applying a matching approach 
to investigate the causal effect of subsidies on export activities we find no impact of 
subsidies on the probability to start exporting, and only weak evidence for an impact 
of subsidies on the growth of the share of exports in total sales in West Germany but 
no evidence in East Germany. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
enterprise-level data used in the empirical investigation. Section 3 reports descriptive 
evidence on subsidies in German manufacturing and their links to exports. Section 4 
presents results from our econometric investigations of the causal effects of 
subsidies on exporting. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The data used in this study are merged from two surveys conducted by the German 
Statistical Offices. One source is a monthly report for establishments in 
manufacturing industries that covers all local production units that have at least 20 
employees itself or that belong to an enterprise with a total of at least 20 employees. 
Information from the monthly surveys is either summed up for a year, or average 
values for a year are computed, and a panel data set is build from annual data. 
Furthermore, the information collected at the establishment level has been 
aggregated at the enterprise level. A detailed description of the information in these 
  3data is given in Konold (2007). For this study we use the information on exports
1 and 
total sales of the enterprise to identify enterprises that are exporters in a year, and to 
compute the share of exports in total sales.  
The second source of data used here is the cost structure survey for 
enterprises in the manufacturing sector. This survey is carried out annually as a 
representative random sample survey (stratified according to the number of 
employees and the industries) of around 18.000 enterprises. While all enterprises 
with 500 or more employees are included in each survey, a stratified random sample 
of smaller firms with 20 to 499 employees is drawn that remains in the survey sample 
for four years in succession and that is replaced by a new stratified random sample 
afterwards. Therefore, data from the cost structure survey can be used to build an 
unbalanced panel containing all enterprises with at least 500 employees (in a year) 
plus a sample of smaller firms with a rotating panel design. A detailed description of 
the cost structure survey can be found in Fritsch et al. (2004).  
In the cost structure survey the enterprise has to report the amount of 
subsidies received in a year. Subsidies are defined as any unrequited payments 
received from federal, regional or local authorities, or from the European 
Communities, to lower costs of production and/or to lower the prices of goods 
produced and/or to allow sufficient payments for factors of production. Hence, we 
refer to this financial assistance as production-related subsidies; they are clearly not 
direct export promotion subsidies.  This information is used to identify enterprises that 
are subsidized in a year, and to compute the amount of subsidies per employee 
received. 
                                                 
1 Exports are deliveries to customers outside Germany or to a German wholesale company that sells 
the goods to a customer in a foreign country. Indirect exports – e. g., tyres that are sold to a German 
manufacturer of cars who exports some of these cars – can not be identified. 
  4Data from the two sources are linked using the enterprise identifier available in 
both surveys. The resulting panel covers the years from 1995 to 2004. Due to the 
introduction of a new industry classification new samples for the cost structure survey 
were drawn after two years in 1997 and in 1999. Furthermore, a new sample was 
drawn in 2003. This leads to a highly unbalanced panel when data for 1995 to 2004 
are used (see Brandt et al. (2008), p. 221).  For the empirical investigation performed 
here, we focus on the sample covered in the cost structure survey from 1999 to 2002. 
These data are confidential but not exclusive. They can be used by researchers on a 
contractual basis via controlled remote data access inside the research data centres 
of the German Statistical Offices (see Zühlke et al. (2004) for details).  
 
3.   Descriptive evidence on subsidies and exports  
Subsidized enterprises are a rare species in manufacturing industries in West 
Germany.
2 According to the figures reported in table 1 only 3.68 percent of all 
enterprises included in the cost structure survey sample received subsidies in 1999, 
and the share dropped to 3.02 percent in 2002. The figures for East Germany are 
much higher – 23.27 percent in 1999 and 20.87 percent in 2002. This shows that 
even more than ten years after re-unification in 1990 there are large differences 
between West and East Germany. Therefore, all investigations have to be performed 
for West and East Germany separately. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive descriptive study (in German) on subsidies in German manufacturing 
enterprises based on a similar data set that, however, is based on information from the cost structure 
surveys only and, therefore, has no information on export activities, see Wagner (2009). 
  5While on average subsidies per employee in subsidized enterprises tend to be 
somewhat higher in West than in East Germany (see table 1), the median value 
tends to be lower in West Germany. In both parts of Germany the median is much 
lower than the mean, pointing to a highly skewed distribution of subsidies. This is 
documented in figure 1 and figure 2, showing the distribution of subsidies per 
employee in subsidized firms in 2000.
3 Note that the maximum amount of subsidies 
per head is much larger in West Germany
4, but that the 90
th decile of the distribution 
is about the same in both parts of Germany according to table 1. 
 
[Figure 1 and figure 2 near here] 
 
The status of whether a firm is subsidized or not is highly stable in West 
Germany over the period 1999 to 2002. Of the 11.124 enterprises that reported to the 
cost structure survey in each year in this period, 93.63 percent were never 
subsidized, and 1.2 percent received subsidies in each year, meaning that only about 
5 percent of all firms switched in and/or out of subsidies (see table 2). Status 
switchers are more often found in East Germany, where 63.35 percent of all 
enterprises received no subsidies over the period, and 11.95 percent received 
subsidies in each year, so that about 25 percent of all enterprises switched their 
status at least once between 1999 and 2002 (see table 3). 
 
[Table 2 and table 3 near here] 
 
Subsidies and exports are positively related. Table 4 and table 5 report in 
column 1 the estimated coefficients from regressions with either the exporter status 
                                                 
3 The pictures for other years look identical; graphs are available upon request. 
4 The exact figures of the maxima are confidential as they refer to a single enterprise. 
  6or the share of exports in total sales as the endogenous variable and with a dummy 
variable for the status of being subsidized or not as explanatory variable for each 
year from 1999 to 2002 for West and East Germany.
5 All regression coefficients are 
positive and highly statistically different from zero according to the p-values, 
indicating that compared to non-subsidized enterprises in both parts of Germany 
subsidized enterprises are more often exporters and have a higher share of exports 
in total sales. In West Germany the same holds when industry fixed effects at the 
detailed 4digit-level are added (see table 4, column 2), while controlling for industry 
affiliation leads to only weakly statistically significant coefficients of the dummy 
variable for subsidized firms in the regression for the share of exports in total sales in 
East Germany in 1999 and 2001, and an insignificant coefficient in 2000. 
 
[Table 4 and table 5 near here] 
 
4.  Effects of subsidies on exports 
The positive relationship between subsidies and exports documented in table 4 and 
table 5 can not be interpreted in a causal way. On the one hand, subsidies may 
cause a firm to start to export, or to increase its share of exports in total sales, by 
helping to cover fixed costs associated with starting to export (e. g., the adaptation of 
the products to regulations in a foreign country) or by lowering variable costs of 
production or exporting. On the other hand, exporting may cause a firm to be 
subsidized when subsidies are aimed for exporting firms due to special government 
programs. The influence may run in one or both directions, and there might be other 
enterprise characteristics besides exports and subsidies that have an influence on 
                                                 
5 The models for the share of exports in total sales are estimated by fractional logit to take care of the 
fact that the share of exports in total sales is a percentage variable with a probability mass at zero due 
to a large share of firms with no exports; see Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and Wagner (2001). 
  7both – research and development activities for example may both foster exports due 
to more innovative products and subsidies due to targeted government programs. 
Regression analyses of the type performed in the previous section cannot reveal 
causal relationships. 
If subsidies are not given to enterprises at random (and we have no reason to 
assume they are) the causal effect of subsidies on starting to export, or on the share 
of exports in total sales, cannot be calculated from comparing subsidized and non-
subsidized firms. If subsidized firms have a higher probability to export (as 
documented in the last section) we can not say whether this is caused by the 
subsidies or not, because we can not observe whether a subsidized firm would have 
started to export without subsidies if it did receive subsidies. We simply do not have 
any information about the counterfactual situation. So how can we be sure that the 
higher probability to export of subsidized firms compared to non-subsidized firms is 
caused by subsidies (or not)?  
This closely resembles a situation familiar from the evaluation of active labour 
market programs (or any other form of treatment of units): If participants, or treated 
units, are not selected randomly from a population but are selected (or self-select) 
according to certain criteria, the effect of a treatment cannot be evaluated by 
comparing the average performance of the treated and the non-treated. However, 
given that each unit (enterprise, or person, etc.) either participated or not, we have no 
information about its performance in the counterfactual situation. A way out is to 
construct a control group in such a way that every treated unit is matched to an 
untreated unit that has been as similar as possible (ideally, identical) at the time 
before the treatment. Differences between the two groups (the treated, and the 
matched non-treated) after the treatment can then be attributed to the treatment (for 
a comprehensive discussion, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith 1999). 
  8To investigate the causal effects of subsidies on the probability to export the 
matching approach is used as follows. We consider receiving subsidies in 2000 as 
the treatment
6, and an export start in 2000 or in 2001 (or not) as the outcome. The 
treatment group is made of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 but with 
subsidies in 2000, and without exports in the years 1997 to 1999. The control group 
is made of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, and without exports in 
1997 to 1999. Matching is done by nearest neighbour propensity score matching. 
The propensity score is estimated from a probit regression of a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not a plant is subsidized (treated) on the number of employees, 
output per employee (labour productivity), wages and salaries per employee (human 
capital intensity), spending on research and development over total sales (R&D 
intensity), and 4-digit industry dummy variables - all measured in 1999, the year 
before the treatment. For German manufacturing firms these variables are both 
linked to the probability to receive subsidies (see Wagner 2009) and to exports (see 
Wagner 2001). 
In an analogous way subsidies in 2001 are considered as the treatment, and 
an export start in 2001 or 2002 (or not) as the outcome. The treatment group then is 
made of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 and 2000 but with subsidies in 
2001, and without exports in the years 1998 to 2000. The control group here is made 
of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002 and without exports in 1998 to 
2000. The variables used to compute the propensity score are from the pre-treatment 
year 2000. 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, subsidies could be considered not as a binary treatment (an enterprise is subsidized or 
not in a year) but as a continuous treatment that varies between zero Euro per employee and some 
maximum amount. We experimented with this continuous treatment approach, but it turned out to be 
not computationally feasible due to the extremely skew distribution of subsidies per employee and the 
large share of non-subsidized firms (see section 3). For the method to investigate a continuous 
treatment see Imbens (2000) and Hirano and Imbens (2004); an application to the analysis of exports 
is  Fryges and Wagner (2008). 
  9The balancing property (that requires an absence of statistically significant 
differences between the treatment group and the control group in the covariates after 
matching) is tested by checking whether the difference in means of the variables 
used to compute the propensity score is never statistically significant between firms 
that started to become subsidized and the matched non-starters. The common 
support condition (that requires that the propensity score of a treated observation is 
neither higher than the maximum nor less than the minimum propensity score of the 
controls) is imposed by dropping subsidy starters (treated observations) whose 
propensity score is higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum propensity 
score of the non-subsidized firms (the controls). Matching is done using Stata 10.1 
and the psmatch2 command (version 3.0.0), see Leuven and Sianesi (2003). 
The difference in the share of export starters (the outcome variable) between 
the subsidy starters (the treated enterprises) and the matched non-subsidized 
enterprises (the non-treated firms) is the so-called average treatment effect on the 
treated, or ATT, the estimated effect of subsidies on the probability to export.  
Results are reported in table 6 for West Germany and in table 7 for East 
Germany. Matching was successful in all cases (taking care of common support); 
there are no statistically significant differences in the mean values of the variables 
used for matching in the pre-treatment year. Note that the probit regressions that are 
used to compute the propensity score include a complete set of 4digit-industry 
dummy variables, so that all observations from an industry that has observations 
from either the control group or the treatment group only are dropped.  
 
[Table 6 and table 7 near here] 
 
  10The difference in the share of export starters (the outcome variable) between 
the subsidy starters (the treated enterprises) and the matched non-subsidized 
enterprises (the non-treated firms) is positive in both periods in West Germany, while 
it is positive in one period and zero in the other in East Germany. This effect, 
however, is estimated using very small numbers of firms in the treatment and the 
control group due to the fact that the cohorts of firms that are subsidized in 2000 or 
2001 for the first time are very small (see table 2 and table 3), and that not all of 
these subsidy starters did not export during the three years before the treatment. The 
small number of cases means that the outcome variable for the group of treated and 
non-treated enterprises is extremely sensitive with regard to one or two more firms 
that start to export. For example, the outcome 0.0625 for the treated group in West 
Germany in the period 2000 to 2001 means that one enterprise from the treated 
group started to export – one more starter would have doubled the estimated ATT. 
Furthermore, the ATT is never statistically different from zero.
7 Therefore, from the 
empirical investigation performed here we have no evidence that subsidies cause 
enterprises to start to export. 
In a second step the causal effect of subsidies on the growth in the share of 
exports in total sales is investigated. Here the matching approach is used as follows. 
We consider receiving subsidies in 2000 as the treatment, and the change in the 
share of exports in total sales from 1999 to 2001 as the outcome. The treatment 
group is made of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 but with subsidies in 2000, 
and with exports in 1999. The control group is made of all enterprises without 
subsidies in 1999 to 2002, and with exports in 1999. Matching is done by nearest 
neighbours propensity score matching. As above, the propensity score is estimated 
                                                 
7 Following the usual approach in the literature the test for the statistical significance of the ATT is 
based on a bootstrap with 500 replications. However, it is “unclear whether the bootstrap is valid in this 
context” (Leuven and Sianesi 2008, p. 1); see also Abadie and Imbens (2008).  
  11from a probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether or not a plant is 
subsidized (treated) on the number of employees, output per employee (labour 
productivity), wages and salaries per employee (human capital intensity), spending 
on research and development over total sales (R&D intensity), and 4-digit industry 
dummy variables - all measured in 1999, the year before the treatment. In an 
analogous way subsidies in 2001 are considered as the treatment, and the change in 
the share of exports in total sales between 2000 and 2002 as the outcome. The 
treatment group then is made of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 and 2000 
but with subsidies in 2001, and with exports in 2000. The control group here is made 
of all enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002 and with exports in 2000. The 
variables used to compute the propensity score are from the pre-treatment year 
2000. Again, the balancing property is tested, and the common support condition is 
imposed. 
Matching is done using Stata 10.1 and the psmatch2 command (version 
3.0.0), see Leuven and Sianesi (2003).The difference in the change of the share of 
exports in total sales (the outcome variable) between the subsidy starters (the treated 
enterprises) and the matched non-subsidized enterprises (the non-treated firms) is 
the so-called average treatment effect on the treated, or ATT, the estimated effect of 
subsidies on the share of exports in total sales.  
Results are reported in table 8 for West Germany and in table 9 for East 
Germany. Matching was successful in all cases (taking care of common support) – 
there are no statistically significant differences in the mean values of the variables 
used for matching in the pre-treatment year. 
 
[Table 8 and table 9 near here] 
 
  12The difference in the change in the share of exports in total sales (the outcome 
variable) between the subsidy starters (the treated enterprises) and the matched non-
subsidized enterprises (the non-treated firms) is positive in both periods in West 
Germany, and it is both large (four percentage points) and statistically significant for 
the second period considered here. Again, the number of firms in the groups of 
treated and non-treated enterprises is small. However, we have at least some weak 
evidence for a positive causal effect of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales 
in West German manufacturing enterprises. This is in contrast to the results for East 
Germany, where the computed ATT is negative in one period and never statistically 
different from zero. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper uses newly available representative panel data for manufacturing 
enterprises to investigate the link between subsidies and exports in Germany for the 
first time. While exports and subsidies are positively related, a matching approach 
applied to uncover any causal effect of subsidies on export activities finds no impact 
of subsidies on the probability to start exporting.  Furthermore, we find some 
evidence for a positive impact of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales in 
West Germany but not in East Germany. 
Our finding of a lack of a robust relationship between subsidies and exporting 
is consistent with results reported in the context of other western economies using 
either export (Bernard and Jensen, 2004) or production-related assistance (Görg et 
al. (2008).  The latter paper, using data for Ireland, also finds no evidence that 
production subsidies encourage firms to start exporting but that they have a positive 
effect on export quantities for those firms that already export.  This perhaps suggests, 
that this kind of financial assistance is less useful in allowing firms to prepare 
  13themselves for overcoming the initial barriers to exporting.  Rather, it seems likely 
that firms use these grants to improve their production processes, increase the 
quality and/or lower the price of their products to remain competitive in export 
markets.  What exactly the mechanisms are by which subsidies allow firms to 
improve their competitiveness, remains an important issue for further research.   
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 Table 1: Subsidies in German manufacturing enterprises, 1999 – 2002 
 
 
            W e s t    E a s t    
            G e r m a n y   G e r m a n y  
Y e a r               
 
 
1999  Number  of  enterprises          13,980     2,729       
  Share of enterprises with subsidies (%)                   3.68    23.27     
  Subsidies per employee (€) in enterprises with subsidies  mean         2,789     2,121 
         median            403           749 
         9 0
th decile      4,602     4,490 
 
2000  Number  of  enterprises          13,876     2,635 
  Share of enterprises with subsidies (%)                   3.24    22.35     
  Subsidies per employee (€) in enterprises with subsidies  mean         2,247     1,491 
         median              314           582 
         9 0
th decile      3,162     3,161        
 
2001  Number  of  enterprises          13,122       2,455 
  Share of enterprises with subsidies (%)                 3.18     21.71 
  Subsidies per employee (€) in enterprises with subsidies  mean         1,983      1,458 
         median              328             592 
         9 0
th decile      3,481      3,198 
 
2002  Number  of  enterprises          12,592       2,314 
  Share of enterprises with subsidies (%)                 3.02     20.87 
  Subsidies per employee (€) in enterprises with subsidies  mean         1,639      1,239 
         median              268             508 
         9 0






 Table 2:  Patterns of participation in subsidies  
  Manufacturing  enterprises in West-Germany, 1999 – 2002 
 
 
    Pattern |       Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
       0000 |     10,415       93.63       93.63 
       0001 |         96        0.86       94.49 
       0010 |         47        0.42       94.91 
       0011 |         45        0.40       95.32 
       0100 |         55        0.49       95.81 
       0101 |          7        0.06       95.87 
       0110 |         20        0.18       96.05 
       0111 |         23        0.21       96.26 
       1000 |        134        1.20       97.46 
       1001 |          4        0.04       97.50 
       1010 |          6        0.05       97.55 
       1011 |         11        0.10       97.65 
       1100 |         56        0.50       98.16 
       1101 |         10        0.09       98.25 
       1110 |         61        0.55       98.80 
       1111 |        134        1.20      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |     11,124      100.00 
 
 
Note: A pattern 0000 (1111) indicates that the enterprises received subsidies 
in no year (all years) between 1999 – 2002; a pattern 0101 indicates that the 





Table 3:  Patterns of participation in subsidies  
  Manufacturing  enterprises  in East-Germany, 1999 – 2002 
 
    Pattern |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
       0000 |      1,272       63.35       63.35 
       0001 |         69        3.44       66.78 
       0010 |         46        2.29       69.07 
       0011 |         35        1.74       70.82 
       0100 |         35        1.74       72.56 
       0101 |          5        0.25       72.81 
       0110 |         15        0.75       73.56 
       0111 |         50        2.49       76.05 
       1000 |         83        4.13       80.18 
       1001 |         12        0.60       80.78 
       1010 |          5        0.25       81.03 
       1011 |         11        0.55       81.57 
       1100 |         53        2.64       84.21 
       1101 |         12        0.60       84.81 
       1110 |         65        3.24       88.05 
       1111 |        240       11.95      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,008      100.00 
 
Note: A pattern 0000 (1111) indicates that the enterprises received subsidies 
in no year (all years) between 1999 – 2002; a pattern 0101 indicates that the 
enterprise received subsidies in the second and fourth year (2000 and 2002), etc.  









Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß  0.938    0.868     
      p  0.000   0.000    
 
Share of export in total sales      ß  0.545    0.373     





Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß  0.890    0.704     
      p  0.000   0.000    
 
Share of export in total sales      ß  0.617    0.430     





Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß  0.603    0.400     
      p  0.000   0.012    
 
Share of export in total sales      ß  0.494    0.306     





Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß  0.729    0.538     
      p  0.000   0.002     
 
Share of exports in total sales      ß  0.527    0.342     
      p  0.000   0.000     
 
 
1Estimated coefficients are from a regression of either a dummy for the exporter status, or the share of 
exports in total sales, on a constant and a dummy variable that takes the value one for subsidized 
firms and zero otherwise in model 1. In model 2 industry fixed effects at the 4digit level are added. The 
models for the exporter dummy variable are estimated by ML logit. The models for the share of 
exports in total sales are estimated by fractional logit to take care of the fact that the share of exports 
in total sales is a percentage variable with a probability mass at zero (due to a large share of firms with 
no exports). p is the prob-value for a test of the null-hypothesis that the estimated regression 


















Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß   0.684     0.429       
      p    0.000     0.000    
  
Share of export in total sales      ß   0.469     0.164     





Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß   0.630     0.436     
      p    0.000     0.000    
  
Share of export in total sales      ß   0.378     0.093     





Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß   0.605     0.375     
      p    0.000     0.003    
 
Share of export in total sales      ß   0.407     0.150     





Exports (Dummy; 1 = yes)      ß  0.610    0.582     
      p  0.000   0.000    
 
Share of export in total sales      ß  0.461    0.316     
      p  0.000   0.000    
 
 
1Estimated coefficients are from a regression of either a dummy for the exporter status, or the share of 
exports in total sales, on a constant and a dummy variable that takes the value one for subsidized 
firms and zero otherwise in model 1. In model 2 industry fixed effects at the 4digit level are added. The 
models for the exporter dummy variable are estimated by ML logit. The models for the share of 
exports in total sales are estimated by fractional logit to take care of the fact that the share of exports 
in total sales is a percentage variable with a probability mass at zero (due to a large share of firms with 
no exports). P is the prob-value for a test of the null-hypothesis that the estimated regression 










  20Table 6: The causal effect of subsidies on starting to export in West German  





 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2000 
  Outcome    Export start in 2000 or in 2001 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 but with subsidies in 2000, 
        and without exports in 1997 to 1999 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
        and without exports in 1997 to 1999 
 
 
  Number of cases  16 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  1999    93.135   114.16   0.607 
 Labour  productivity  1999    2.0e+5   1.8e+5   0.761 
 Human  capital  intensity  1999    29128   28212   0.668 
 R&D  intensity  1999     0.00036 0.00041 0.915 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 





 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2001 
  Outcome    Export start in 2001 or in 2002 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 and 2000, but with subsidies in  
        2001, and without exports in 1998 to 2000 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
        and without exports in 1998 to 2000 
 
 
  Number of cases  19 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  2000    87.202   55.325   0.170 
 Labour  productivity  2000    98465     76489     0.316 
 Human  capital  intensity  2000    25939   23328   0.428 
 R&D  intensity  2000     0.00079 0.000   0.324 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 
    0.10526 0.000   0.10526 0.268 
 
 
1 ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated; the p-value is based on a bootstrap with 500 
  replications   
  21Table 7: The causal effect of subsidies on starting to export in East German 




 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2000 
  Outcome    Export start in 2000 or in 2001 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 but with subsidies in 2000, 
        and without exports in 1997 to 1999 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
        and without exports in 1997 to 1999 
 
 
  Number of cases  33 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  1999    73.733   77.641   0.819 
 Labour  productivity  1999    82733     71261     0.510 
 Human  capital  intensity  1999    18896   18904   0.996 
 R&D  intensity  1999     0.00572 0.00465 0.818 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 




 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2001 
  Outcome    Export start in 2001 or in 2002 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 and 2000, but with subsidies in  
        2001, and without exports in 1998 to 2000 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
        and without exports in 1998 to 2000 
 
 
  Number of cases  24 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  2000    64.743   108.28   0.103 
 Labour  productivity  2000    91850     95486     0.879 
 Human  capital  intensity  2000    18797   18582   0.898 
 R&D  intensity  2000     0.000       0.000   1.000 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 




1 ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated; the p-value is based on a bootstrap with 500 
   replications   
 
  22Table 8: The causal effect of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales in  




 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2000 
  Outcome    Change in share of exports in total sales (2001 – 1999) 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 but with subsidies in 2000, 
    and  with  exports  in  1999 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
    and  with  exports  in  1999 
 
 
  Number of cases  89 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  1999    345.88   229.01   0.286 
 Labour  productivity  1999    1.6e+5   1.6e+5   0.970 
 Human  capital  intensity  1999    32069   31848   0.860 
 R&D  intensity  1999     0.01748 0.01493 0.627 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 




 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2001 
  Outcome    Change in share of exports in total sales (2002 – 2000) 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 and 2000, but with subsidies in 
        2001, and with exports in 2000 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
    and  with  exports  in  2000 
 
 
  Number of cases  71 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  2000    280.12   239.78   0.577 
 Labour  productivity  2000    1.6e+5   1.5e+5   0.445 
 Human  capital  intensity  2000    31882   32453   0.630 
 R&D  intensity  2000     0.02119 0.02002 0.871 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 
    2.652     -1.356   4.008     0.044 
 
 
1 ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated; the p-value is based in a bootstrap with 500 
   replications 
   
 
  23Table 9: The causal effects of subsidies on the share of exports in total sales in 




 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2000 
  Outcome    Change in share of exports in total sales (2001 – 1999) 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 but with subsidies in 2000, 
    and  with  exports  in  1999 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
    and  with  exports  in  1999 
 
 
  Number of cases  53 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  1999    140.07   202.41   0.426 
 Labour  productivity  1999    94067     94687     0.947 
 Human  capital  intensity  1999    21361   21961   0.635 
 R&D  intensity  1999     0.01045 0.01254 0.599 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 




 Treatment   Subsidies  in  2001 
  Outcome    Change in share of exports in total sales (2002 – 2000) 
 
  Treatment group  Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 and 2000, but with subsidies in 
        2001, and with exports in 2000 
 
  Control group    Enterprises without subsidies in 1999 to 2002, 
    and  with  exports  in  2000 
 
 
  Number of cases  45 
 
  Mean of variables used for matching 
 after  matching      Treated   Control   p-value 
 
 Number  of  employees  2000    114.41   108.93   0.824 
 Labour  productivity  2000    1.6e+5   1.8e+5   0.642 
 Human  capital  intensity  2000    23080   22094   0.507 
 R&D  intensity  2000     0.01486 0.01232 0.681 
 
 
 Outcome   Treated   Control     ATT   p-value  (500  repl.) 
    4.319     0.237   4.082   0.274 
 
 
1 ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated; the p –value is based on a bootstrap with 500 
   replications 
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1 Kernel density estimate (epanechnikov kernel, bandwith = 228.95); included are all manufacturing 
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1 Kernel density estimate (epanechnikov kernel, bandwith = 221.47) ; included are all manufacturing 
  enterprises with subsidies in 2000 
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